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Command or Responsibility? Levinas, Darwall and Løgstrup on Second-Personal 
Ethics 
Robert Stern 
 ǣǯǡǮ-ǯǤǤÞǤǯ
treats the second-personal relation as one of command as an exercise of authority, while 
K. E. Løgstrup treats the second-personal relation as one of responsibility rather than 
command. It is argued that Løgstrup raises a fundamental difficulty for any command 
view, namely that the reason to act on a command is because one has been commanded 
to do so, where this cannot provide the right reason for a moral action. The paper 
considers where Levinas should be located in this debate between the two models of 
second-personal ethics represented by Darwall and Løgstrup. It is suggested that while 
Levinasǯ both accounts, he is perhaps closer to the 
command approach, in a way that then makes him vulnerable to Løgstrǯ objections. 
 
Key word: Emmanuel Levinas, Stephen Darwall, K. E. Løgstrup, second-personal ethics, 
ethical responsibility, command accounts of obligation 
 
Despite their differences in style, historical background and underlying assumptions, it is 
perhaps nonetheless not surprising that so-ǮǯǮǯ
can still come to focus on similar philosophical problems and offer parallel responses to 
them, insofar as those problems are fundamental ones and the responses have an obvious 
appeal. To many, it has appeared that something like this has happened in the cases of 
Emmanuel Levinas and Stephen Darwall; for while each comes from clearly different 
philosophical traditions, and could hardly be more divergent in their manner of writing, 
arguing and even ultimate objectives, both nevertheless seem to have arrived at a rather 
similar view of ethics as fundamentally second-personal, where this is understood as 
involving an authority relation between individuals which explains how we can be 
obligated to one another.1 In this way, it appears, each offers a broadly comparable 
solution to the problem of moral obligation, where the bindingness of morality is said to 
derive from this authority as a kind of command; and where once God was seen as the 
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source of such commands in ethics, they treat the ethical situation as one in which we can 
command each other in an analogous way. 
 My aim in this paper is to explore this apparent convergence Ȃ where I will use the 
work of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup to suggest that it is perhaps 
more problematic than it has seemed. For, although Løgstrup may look like a third figure 
to have also arrived at a view close to the picture sketched above, I will argue that his 
position is importantly different: for while his ethics is also second-personal, it is one not 
of command but of responsibility, which gives it a very different structure. I will also 
argue that when it comes to Levinas, his position is perhaps best thought of as 
somewhere between Darwall and Løgstrup on this issue Ȃ and I will explore whether this 
makes it an attractive middle way, or an incoherent compromise that needs to opt for one 
alternative or the other, and so choose between the command model that Darwall offers 
or the responsibility model that Løgstrup represents.2 
 I will begin by outlining how the second-personal approach represented by ǡǯ
a broadly similar way. I will then presenÞǯ
second-personal relation, and his alternative account. I will finally discuss where in the 
end we should locate Levinas in this debate between Darwall and Løgstrup on the nature 
of second-personal ethics. 
 
1. Turning divine command theory on its head: From divine command to the command of 
the other 
In her well-Ǯǯǡ
ǤǤǤ
that there is a fundamental problem with the idea of moral obligation as a distinctively 
ethical form of normativity: namely, that while this idea made sense when it was 
grounded in an account of God as a divine lawgiver who obliged us through his 
commands, we have now largely lost this view of the world, and without it the idea of 
moral obligation becomes empty Ȃ Ǯǯ
there is no criminal law and no courts.3 Anscombe thus counsels us to put the notions of Ǯǳǳǡǲǳǡǲǳǥǯanage it,4 and 
thus do our best to banish it from our discourse. 
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 Others are more sanguine than Anscombe, however: for, they have suggested that           Ǯǯ    
fundamentally a matter of law, obligation and duty, nonetheless alternative sources for 
this obligation can be found to God as a lawgiver, which means that this model of ethics 
can survive his demise Ȃ where one option here is to claim that we can obligate one 
another through our own commands, thus transforming a theistic conception into a 
humanistic one. 
 It is clear from the way that Darwall presents his position that he sees his account 
of the second-personal relation in ethics as arising in this way, and in his view some such 
shift lies behind the development of modern ethics more generally, from Samuel 
Pufendorf onwards. Moreover, he argues that this shift was not just a result of our having 
to come to terms with the death of God, but rather is inherent to the logic of the divine 
c ǡ  
ǯ 
mere coercion, similar kinds of authority must also be attributed to us, so that we can 
emerge as law-Ǥ	ǡ
ǯ-coercive only insofar 
as we recognize his authority and so hold ourselves to it; but in doing so, we recognize 
ourselves and each other as similarly authoritative. Once this occurs, Darwall argues, 
second-personal ethics as he conceives it becomes an option, where what makes the 
moral situation second-personal in his sense is that one individual has the authority to 
command or require the other to act in a person-to-person way Ȃ an authority that does 
not just reside in God, but in all of us as representatives of what he cal Ǯ ǯǤ             ǮǯǡǮǯǮ accountable ǯǤ5 
 Darwall illustrates what he has in mind here with a Hume-inspired example, of a 
person standing on your foot. In this case, one reason this person has to get off your foot 
is the pain he is causing, which is a bad thing; but if he removed his foot for that reason, ǡǮ state-of-the-world-
regarding and agent-neutral ǯǤ6 On the other hand, the person 
might see that you have the authority to require him to get off your foot, so you can 
command or order that he do so. If he were to remove his foot for this reason, he would 
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now be relating to you as such, as his reason to act is that you have required this of him, in 
a way that binds him to you in a second-personal manner by connecting you together as 
two individuals in a way that your being in pain does not. Put simply, if he gets off your 
foot because it is causing pain, he does not relate to you as a self, but just as a place where 
something bad is happening; but if he gets off your foot because he acknowledges your 
authority to require this of him, a genuine relation between persons occurs through this 
recognition. Darwall therefore agrees with the divine command theorist in treating 
commanding authority as a central to ethics, while rejecting their claim that only God can 
serve as such an authority; rather, we can all issue such commands and thus bind each 
other in the distinctively second-personal way that is characteristic of moral obligation. 
 Turning now to Levinas, it can appear that at a fundamental level, his picture is    ǯǤ  ǡ ǯ      
individuals and thus on their relation to one another in a second-personal form. 
Moreover, he also focuses on the ethical encounter as involving obligations to the other 
person, where the basis for that obligation appears to come from the authority to 
command. Likewise, Levinas seems to present his account as a kǮǯ
the divine command model, where the authority of the other relates in some way to the 
authority over us that we might also bestow on God, as both are equally characterized as 
transcendent, so that the other represents this divine authority to us but in a human 
form.7 Finally, as Darwall himself notes,8 Levinas would seem to endorse what Darwall  Ǯ	ǯǯǡ
coercion, as to command is to still respect the person commanded as a free and rational 
agent, and not to aim at taking this away; and to see the person as a free and rational 
agent is to see them as likewise capable of issuing commands of their own. 
 Several of these themes come together in a crucial passage from a crucial chapter 
in Totality and InfinityǡǣǮ	ǯǣ 
The presence of the face coming from beyond the world, but committing me to 
human fraternity, does not overwhelm me as a numinous essence arousing fear 
and trembling. To be in relationship while absolving oneself from this relation is to 
speak. The Other does not only appear in his face, as a phenomenon subject to the 
action and domination of a freedom; infinitely distant from the very relation he 
enters, he presents himself there from the first as an absolute. The I disengages 
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itself from the relationship, but does so within relationship with a being absolutely 
separate. The face with which the Other turns to me is not reabsorbed in a 
representation of the face. To hear his destitution which cries out for justice is not 
to represent an image to oneself, but is to posit oneself as responsible, both as 
more and as less than the being that presents itself in the face. Less, for the face 
summons me to my obligations and judges me. The being that presents himself in 
the face comes from a dimension of height, a dimension of transcendence whereby 
he can present himself as a stranger without opposing me as obstacle or enemy. 
More, for my position as I consists in being able to respond to this essential 
destitution of the Other, finding resources for myself. The Other who dominates 
me in his transcendence is thus the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom 
I am obliged.9 
It will be helpful to consider this in more detail, to bring out the ways in can be connected ǯǤ 
 Levinas begins by reiterating a point made throughout Totality and Infinity, that 
the other person is not presented to us as another item in the world, as one object 
amongst others, but as something that cannot be encompassed within this world. For 
Levinas, this is crucially seen in discourse, where to engage in discourse with another 
person is precisely to engage with them as unconfined by any prior assumptions or 
conceptions one may have of them or what they may say, but to remain open to them in ǤǡǮ      ǯǡ10 which would reduce fraternity to 
mere sameness. Nonetheless, while radically other, there is fraternity here in the sense       Ǯ  ǯ      ǡ  ǯ

in the work of that name. The other person does not present himself to me as a coercive 
power, set to overwhelm or destroy me, so to that extent our relation is fraternal. 
Likewise, while in the encounter with the other I thereby relate to his face, there is clearly 
more to our relation than just this, in that the other is not just his face qua bodily entity, 
as this would be to relate to him once more as an object in the world.11 But qua subject,  Ǯǯ ǡ it is through turning 
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his face to me that I encounter the other, but not in such a way that I can reduce the other 
to what I find there. 
 ǡ     Ǯ   ǯǡ 
way as to make me responsible,  Ǯǯ Ǯǯ
who presents themselves to me. What makes me less than them is that they both summon 
me to my obligations and judge me accordingly, so that (as Levinas famously puts it) ǮȏȐǯǡ
him above me as a kind of authority.12 ǮǯǡǮǯǣǡ
as the stranger, requiring me to respond to his needs. Thus, while my status is in some 
sense lower than his insofar as I am placed under his authority, at the same time my    Ǯǯ  ǡ            
cannot do for himself, as I possess what he does not. As needful in this way, the other is 
not merely the stranger, but also the widow and orphan of the biblical injunction, which 
exhorts us to provide for them all.13  
 Thus, in a way that Levinas repeats on many occasions,14 the relation between self ǮǯǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǣ
apparently gives the other height and puts them above me is their capacity to command 
and thus put me under an obligation to respond, while at the same time what puts them 
beneath me is that they have needs they cannot satisfy for themselves, in a way that 
makes them frail and vulnerable in a way that I am not. Nonetheless, from their position 
of authority and command, they are in a position to require me to come to their 
assistance, where it is precisely through their destitution that they have this authority to 
command, in a way that is then not merely coercive as it is legitimated in this way.  
 While of course many of the underlying themes and concerns are very different, it 
is thus nonetheless not surprising that faced with passages such as these, some important 
common ground has been identified between Darwall and Levinas. They would seem to 
agree that obligation is a matǮǯǮǯǡ
thereby exercises authority in a manner that was once (and still may be) associated with 
the divine,15 but now becomes a second-personal relation between individuals. Moreover, 
like Darwall, Levinas also seems to draw a link between the authority of the individual Ǯǯǡ
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Ǯ	ǯǯǣǡ
myself be ǤǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǢ  ǡ ǮȏȐ           
myselǢǯȋǡǤ ? ? ?ȀǡǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ
Thus, coming from rather different directions and under rather different influences, it 
would seem that Darwall and Levinas have converged at a somewhat similar point. 
 In the discussion above, I have therefore suggested that in their own ways, both 
Darwall and Levinas can be read as coming to their account of moral obligation as a 
humanistic development of a divine command view, and that in many respects a step of 
this sort is an attractive and even obvious one to take. For, to see moral obligation as the 
result of a command or demand of someone in authority over another is precisely to 
explain what makes it binding on the will of the latter person, as that is what it is to be 
under a command or demand, as Darwall frequently notes:  
There can be no such thing as moral obligation and wrongdoing without the 
normative standing to demand and hold agents accountable for compliance. Of 
course, many of the reasons that ground claims of wrong and obligation are not 
themselves second-personal. That an action would cause severe harm, or even 
pain to your bunions, is a reason for someone not to do it, whether or not anyone 
has any standing to demand that he not, and it supports, moreover, a relevant 
demand. But the action cannot violate a moral obligation unless such standing 
exists, so any reason that is entailed by the obligation must be second-personal. 
Consequently, if moral obligations purport to provide conclusive normative 
reasons, other reasons to the contrary notwithstanding, then this must derive 
somehow from their second-personal character.16 
On this view, which Levinas may seem to share, what makes ethics second-personal is 
that it involves the commanding relation between persons, one of whom has authority 
over the other, where through the exercise of this authority they are able to put this 
second person under an obligation, as something they are now required to do. 
 
2. From an ethics of command to an ethics of responsibility
 8 
However, despite the attractions of this command model of second-personal ethics, I now 
what to challenge it, using resources from the ethics of K. E. Løgstrup to cast doubt on this 
way of conceiving of the nature of our ethical relations. I will suggest that while Løgstrup 
also deserves to be seen as a representative of a second-personal ethics, for him the key 
relation between persons is not that of command, but rather of the responsible use of the 
power we have over others, where it is this that gives us reasons to act that tie us 
together in a distinctively second-personal manner. Once we see the difficulties Løgstrup 
raises for the command view, we can then turn to consider if Levinas is best understood 
that way at all, and thus whether there is more distance between him and Darwall than 
has been made evident so far. 
 To understand Løgstrup fundamental objection to the command conception of 
second-person ethics, it is useful to begin with a feature of that view which Darwall 
himself highlights and makes central   ǣ ǡ    ǯ
terms, it involves command rather than counsel. The crucial difference, as Hobbes makes 
clear, is that in the case of counsel, the reason to act is the reason to do whatever it is one 
is counseled to do; whereas in the case of command, the reason to act is that one has been ǤǣǮcounsel is a precept, 
in which the reason of my obeying is taken from the thing itself which is advised; but 
command is a precept, in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the 
commanderǯǤ17 Thus, if I advise or counsel you to take out a pension, then your reason to 
do so is for whatever reasons I adduce that make having a pension a good idea; but if I 
command or order you to take out a pension, and I have the authority to do so, then your 
reason to act in this way is that this is what I have ordered you to do. If you take out a 
pension, but because you think it will make your retirement more comfortable rather 
than because this is what I have ordered you to do, you may have acted as I commanded, 
but you have still not actually obeyed my order, so my words have served merely as 
counsel, not as command. The command to take out the pension thus gives you a further 
reason to act, on top of the reasons that may make it sensible to have a pension anyway, 
and it is only when you act on the basis of the reason generated by the command that my 
authority over you has been acknowledged and acted upon. Commands thus give rise to ǤǤǤ Ǯ-ǯǣ18 the reason to act is just 
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that you have been commanded to do so by a legitimate authority, not what it is that you 
have been commanded to do. 
Now, as we have seen, for Darwall it is because the reason depends on authority in 
this way, that it is second-ǡǮA second-personal reason is one whose 
validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between persons 
and, therefore, on the possibility   ǯ   -to-personǯǤ19 If I 
order you to take out a pension, I have given you a second-personal reason to act because 
that reason depends on my authority relation to you; if I just advise you, I have given you 
a reason that applies to you regardless of our relation to one another, and so no second-
personal reason is in play. 
 The difficulty with this view, however, is that in the ethical case, it always looks 
best to pass the buck from the command to the reasons why the action has been 
commanded, and to act on this basis, thus rendering the command redundant. This is why 
versions of the Euthyphro objection to divine command account of ethics are so familiar: 
either we act on the reason why God has commanded us to act, in which case the 
command drops out; or we act simply because God has commanded us to do so, but then 
the action looks arbitrary from the moral point of view, as it is not clear how a command 
(even from God) can give one a moral reason to act. For example, if I do not lie to you 
because God has commanded that I do not lie, it would seem that I have adopted the 
wrong motivating reason, as I should not lie to you because so doing will mistreat you in 
various ways; and likewise, these ways also seem the right justifying reason not to lie. It is               Ǯ-ǯ
authority; for in the moral case, the moral agent who simply acts on the authority but 
ignores the reasons behind it would be failing as a moral agent in failing to see the 
rational force of those reasons in their own right. Put simply, while it is fine for a soldier 
to simply follow orders qua orders,20 it is not fine for a moral agent to do so, and thus to 
this extent the command model fails: either the moral agent must see the reason why he 
is being commanded to act in some way, in which case he should act on those reasons; or 
if he cannot see any such reason why he is being commanded, he should not follow the 
command at all. 
 Turning now to Løgstrup, he raises this as an important difficulty for any ǡǮǯǡ
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ǮȏȐǯǡ ǮȏȐ ǯǡ ǮȏȐ
that does not exclude that this authority is in turn justified in some kind of order of ǯǤ ǡ              
commands; rather, ethics involves requirements or demands on us which we follow ǡǮȏȐǯǤ21 A demand or requirement is thus not Ǯ-indǯ   ǣ   ǡ Ǯ       ǯǡ22 so that the reason to act on it is not that this has been required or 
demanded of us as such, but because of what it is we owe or are responsible for, on which 
the demand is based. It is interesting to note that in putting forward this argument, 
Løgstrup was in part arguing against his earlier self (as well as the Kierkegaardian divine 
command theorist who is the explicit target of this part of his paper), as at a much earlier 
stage in his career he had argued for a divine command view as the only way to explain  ǮǯǢ23 but by this later period in his development he had come to see that 
any such position was problematic, for the reasons outlined here. If Løgstrup is right, 
therefore, Darwall is wrong to see ethics as second-personal in the sense of involving 
some kind of command from one individual to another, and thus as the exercise of 
authority over them in this sense. 
 It might be said, however, that t  ǯ ǡ    Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ 
suggested by Løgstrup above. But it is not clear that this is an option for Darwall. For on 
his account, if he treats demands as less than commands, they would then either seem to 
have a purely epistemic role of alerting an individual to what it is they are already 
required to do, or of blaming them for not having done what they are already required to 
do; but on either option, this would be to no longer treat demanding as giving the 
individual a second-personal reason for action. For, on the one hand, Darwall is clear that ǡ Ǯǲǳǡǯ ǯǤ24 
On the other hand, if to demand someone act is to attach blame or some other sanction to 
so acting, then the demand does not make the reason to act second-personal in itself, but 
gives them a further reason to act which arguably should not be the one that moves the 
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moral agent, namely fear of punishment. It is precisely to avoid these options that 
Darwall treats demand as an exercise of practical authority, not merely epistemic 
authority or sanction. Moreover, if that authority is no more than an ability to judge a 
person or hold them to account for not acting as they should, there is then a prior reason 
in the light of which they are being judged and to which they are being held to account, so 
the demand does not itself give rise to the reason to act or make it the case that they 
should so act, and so render this reason second-personal as such. For example, you might 
have the authority to condemn the person who stands on your foot, but unless that 
authority itself creates the reason to act as on the command model, it merely holds 
someone to a reason he already has and fails to make this reason second-personal, while 
it is not clear why he would not do best to act on this prior reason. It would thus seem 
that Darwall needs to be committed to the command view that is criticized by Løgstrup, if 
his view is to work. 
 However, if Løgstrup rejects the sort of command view proposed by Darwall, in 
what way does it make sense to think of him as pǮ-ǯǡ
thus place him alongside Darwall and Levinas at all? If the key concept here is not 
command, what else could it be that qualifies the position as second-personal in any ǫ ǡ  Þǯ    cal case, A commanding B to BA is not 
sufficient on its own to make B morally required to BA, but the requirement must come 
from some further reason B has to BA, it might seem that we are then driven to base it on ǮǯǢ25 but for him this then renders the reason third-ǡ               ǡ  ǯ
recognition of that authority. Nonetheless, while clearly a species of second-personal 
ethics, does this command model exhaust the genus? For, it could be argued, one can take 
ethics to fundamentally involve the relation between persons in a broader way that this, 
which equally deserves to be called second-personal in some sense,26 where the relevant 
reasons depend constitutively on the relation between individuals, even though that 
relation involves no exercise of authority between them.  
 If this broader approach is acceptable, then it certainly seems possible to classify a    Þǯ  Ǯ-ǯǤ 	ǡ  Þǯ ǡ  
fundamental to ethics is our responsibility for one another, which cannot be made sense 
of in exclusively third personal terms: namely, without taking seriously how we relate to 
 12 
each other in conditions of vulnerability and dependence on the one hand, and 
concomitant power on the other, where what puts me under an obligation to you are the 
constraints on how that power can then legitimately be used, which is to act for your ǤǯǣÞǯuld agree that my obligation to get 
off your foot does not simply come from the fact that I have caused you pain and that pain 
is bad; but rather than seeing it as coming from your resulting authority over me as 
Darwall does, Løgstrup would argue that it comes from the position I now occupy in 
relation to you Ȃ namely, that I now have your well-ǮǯÞ
it,27 placing me in a power relation over you that can only be understood from a second-
personal perspective, as constituted by the connection between us as persons. For, this 
power involves owing something to you in a person-to-person way, where the power I 
have over other things of value (such as an art work or beautiful landscape, for example) 
does not. If we were to abstract from this relation of power and the responsibility it 
brings, and fail to see this as reason-giving by only treating the pain as a source of 
reasons to act, we would be neglecting the vital normative role of the relation between 
persons and the reasons these generate; our inability to abstract in this way thus makes 
this account second-personal in a recognizable sense. 
 Þǯ-personal one, 
as it is the relation between individuals which must be seen as essential in understanding 
the reasons there are to act, which cannot be understood as reasons independently of 
these relations; but unlike Darwall, the relation in question is not one of command or 
authority, but one of dependence and power, and thus of responsibility. In an early essay  Ǯ  ǯ   ? ? ? ?ǡ Þ     of his 
thinking clear in distinguishing duty as a monadic concept from responsibility as a dyadic 
one, in the sense that one can conceive of the duty not to lie or not to steal without 
bringing in others as the ground of the duty, whereas one cannot conceive of 
responsibility except as responsibility for someone.28 As a result, Løgstrup argues, in the  Ǯ ǯǡ
the situation as one of responsibility immediately introduces the other person into 
consideration, thus making clear the normative basis for the action:29 namely, the reason 
to act is the person for whom one is responsible, and their needs, thereby rendering the 
situation an inherently relational one.30 
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3. Levinas: Between Darwall and Løgstrup 
If it is therefore correct to see Darwall and Løgstrup as offering contrasting conceptions 
of second-personal ethics Ȃ one based on authority and command, and the other based on 
vulnerability and power Ȃ the question then arises where Levinas should be placed on 
this spectrum. As we have seen, when Levinas speaks of the relation between self and Ǯǯǡǯǡ
the other over the self in a position of commanding authority. However, at the same time 
as we have also seen, Levinas also emphasizes the way in which the other lacks what it is ǡǮǯǡǮǡ
the widow, and the orphan, to whǯǤ31 Moreover, Levinas also emphasizes 
that no one can replace me when it comes to this relation, so that the responsibility binds 
us as particular individuals. He can thus be read as underlining the relational aspect of 
this connection in th    Þǡ      ǮȏȐ  
bound up with the non-ǯǡǮ   ǯǤ32 Levinas thus emphasizes just the kind of vulnerability and 
dependence that w      Þǯ ǡ  ǯǡ
forms the basis of our obligations to act, much as it was once conceived to come from the 
authority over us that belongs to God. Does it make sense to position Levinas as closer to 
one of these options than the other, or does he represent some way of bringing them 
together? Or is his position unstable because he does not see the tension here, or does he 
try to overcome but in an incoherent way? 
 ǮǯǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǡǯ
two models: the obligation arises both through the capacity to command, conjoined with 
the vulnerability of the other. It is thus worth exploring whether any such combination is 
feasible. 
 ǡǯǡ
is to see the vulnerabǮǡǡǯ
grounding for the authority they have over the self, in a way that makes the authority 
legitimate rather than an exercise of merely coercive force. Thus, it might be argued, in 
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the parable of the Good Samaritan, what gives the injured traveller the right to command 
the Samaritan to help him is precisely the fact that he is injured, destitute and in need, 
while the Samaritan is in a position to alleviate this need; nonetheless, what makes it 
obligatory for the Samaritan to act is strictly that this command is issued (or could   Ȍǡ           ǯ
capacity to help him. Nonetheless, on this account there would still be an important      Ǯǯ  Ǯǯǣ     
basis for the former, in giving the authority of the other a legitimate basis, even though 
the reason to act would come from the exercise of that authority and not from their 
needs. 
 However, it is not clear that this position really provides a satisfactory synthesis of 
the two options, for of course the reason to act remains based on the command, even if       Ǯ ǯ, and thus stems from the 
destitution of the other person. Løgstrup can still claim, therefore, that this puts both the 
motivating and justifying reason in the wrong place: it is not the command of the traveller 
that obliges the Samaritan to help him, but the way in which the life of the traveller is ǯǤ  Þǯ
adequate middle position. 
 Another possibility of synthesizing ideas from Darwall and Løgstrup through 
Levinas might be consider whether Levinas shows how the relation between self and 
other need not be one of command, but could still involve some other exercise of 
authority whereby the other holds the self to account for his actions. Thus, Levinas might   Þǯ   
about through command but through our responsibilities, but nonetheless as following 
Darwall in thinking that we can hold others to account for not acting on those 
responsibilities and hence blaming them in certain distinctive ways if they fail to live up 
to them. There also might be grounds for thinking that Darwall would be happier with 
this combination of views than Løgstrup would be with the previous option, as Darwall 
himself speaks frequently of blame and other reactive attitudes as a marker of the kind of 
second personal authority he has in mind, and which he takes to be constitutive of moral 
obligation.33 
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 A reading of Levinas along these lines can be given some textual support if we note   Ǯǯ ǡǮǯǡǮǯǡch is 
actually how he puts things in the crucial passage from Totality and Infinity with which ǣǮǯȋ
à mes obligations et me juge).34 The difference here is significant: for whereas (as we 
have seen) a command creates a new reason to act that was not there already, where it is 
in then acting on this new reason that one obeys the command, this is not the case when 
it comes to a summons or a judgement of blame: for, as Levinas himself makes clear, the 
person is here called to act or blamed for not acting in the light of what he or she already 
has reason to do, so this does not create the obligation but rather holds them to it and 
assesses them in terms of it, which is still an exercise of authority of some sort (and hence ǮǯȌǡǤÞǮǯ
other is not itself constituted by the command of the other, but also as agreeing with        Ǯǯ    ǡ            ǡ     Ǯǯ    ǡ  
Løgstrup is right that the obligation we are under arises as such because of the need 
which we are in a position to assuage.35 Levinas might thus be read as revealing aspects 
of this second-personal view that could be made attractive to both sides in the debate, 
and show how they could be brought together. 
 While a resolution of this sort has considerable appeal, it should however be noted 
in conclusion that this way out may also prove problematic, for reasons that relate to 
where we began. For, as we saw at the outset, Darwall is explicit in presenting his ethics 
as a kind of humanistic successor to divine command ethics, as offering a way to think of 
the latter in terms of the relation between individuals instead of the relation between   
Ǥ ǡ  ǡ ǯ account can only claim to be a 
successor of this sort if it properly incorporates within it precisely the conception of Ǯǯǡ   Þǣ ǡ  Ǯnt-ǯ               
ǯ 
alone that generates the obligation to act, and nothing else. It is thus a very different 
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position to claim that God summons and judges us in the light of our prior obligations; ǯǮǯ
understand him along the lines outlined above, which is perhaps a price that he would 
not be prepared to pay. 
 Likewise, when it comes to Levinas himself, he too seems to envisage his project as 
bringing significant aspects of the divine command tradition within an inter-personal ǡǯǮǯǤ
Nonetheless, when Levinas does try to bring the two together explicitly, it is perhaps no   Ǯǯǡ ǮǯǮǯǣǮǡǡǡlways 
say, this is the word of God. The face is the site of the word of God, a word not ǯǤ36 ǡǯ
ethics in his theological thinking, it could also be argued that for him there is a price to be 
paid if we take too seriously an ethics of responsibility which does without all talk of 
command. 
 Therefore what perhaps ultimately makes it possible for Løgstrup to be different 
both from Darwall and from Levinas, is that his ethics never really fell under the spell of 
the divine command model.  For while there is a deep connection between his ethical and  ǡ        ǡ   
ǯ  
predominantly that of a creator rather than a commander; thus within this tradition, 
normativity is not to be fundamentally traced back to what is imposed on through the 
exercise of authority, but as arising out of the framework of relations that constitute the 
necessary conditions for life. It is thus less surprising that Løgstrup can come to develop 
second-personal ethics in the way that he does, while for Darwall and Levinas it is harder 
to entirely shake the grip on their imaginations of the command model; at the same time 
this difference can give rise to the kind of productive dialogue between them that has 
been traced out in this paper.37 
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which I stand to a case or another person Ȃ namely in accordance with its moral value. 
But duty as a task stands alone, while it is a sign of involving a relationship that 
responsibility has a preposition attached: reǲforǳ: A person ǲǳǡǲǳ his child. The engineer is responsible ǲǳ the 
carrying capacity of the bridge, etc. They must ensure the things for which they have 
assumed responsibility.ǯ 
29 ǮȏȐǤ
Because the concept of duty isolates a person, therefore he seeks a reason. For when a ǡǣǲǫǳǥ
responsibility. What matters is that the concept of responsibility as opposed to the concept 
of duty does not require any justification. The other person, for whom the person has ǡǥǤ
human being is not alone; but he is for the other Ȃ and in the preoccupation with that 
there is neither time nor place for such refined ǯ
behaviourǯȋǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ 
30 Þǯǡncluding 
The Ethical Demand: see e.g. pp. 53- ?ȀǤ ? ?ǣǮ
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relationship, we are always in advance compelled to decide whether to use our power 
over the other person for serving him or her or for serving ourselves. There are many 
motives for the latter, all the way from the gratification of a lust for power on the part of 
those who possess it to a use of power in anxiety. But in the moment of decision however 
we are confronted by the demand that the power over the other person be used in such a 
way as to serve him or her. That we are inescapably confronted at all times with this ǲǳǤ
that our mutual relationships are relationships of power while ignoring the demand 
thereby implied is to remain indifferent to the question whether the power we have over 
the other person is to be used to serve him or her or to serve ourselves at his or her ǯǤǡesponsibility remains fundamental to ÞǯǡThe Ethical Demand does also express reservations about how the 
concept can be (and has been) misused, for example in seeming to make our obligations 
to others limitless and hence confusing moral responsibility with political responsibility 
(see Chapter 3 §2), or in making us think that to behave responsibly is to behave in a 
reflective manner, and thus with out the spontaneity of the kind of love that Løgstrup 
thinks is central to the ethical demand (Chapter 8 §1). Nonetheless, I think the basic Þǯǡ
these warnings are also born in mind. 
31 TI, p. 215/TEI, p. 237. 
32 ǮǯǡǤ ? ?Ǥ 
33 Cf. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, pp. 27-28. 
34 TI, p. 215/TEI p. 237. 
35 Løgstrup himself also allows that if we are responsible for someone, this is because we 
have a power over them and we are thus responsible to the source of that power in a way 
that makes us answerable for its use; he thus sometimes speaks of this as an authority 
qua judge who can hold us to account in light of this responsibility, and to which we are 
therefore answerable: cf. The Ethical Demand, p. 171/Den Etiske Fordring, p. 195. 
36 Is it Righteous to Be?, p. 215 
37 I am very grateful to Mike Morgan, Diane Perpich and James Lewis for very helpful 
discussion of the issues raised in this paper. 
